Monday, November 16, 2009
The Essential Fusion
This is an insightful piece about the nature of the conflict between liberalism and conservatism.
Tuesday, October 27, 2009
Wednesday, October 21, 2009
Victor Davis Hanson
Victor Davis Hanson is one of the classiest men around. Articles of his (like this one) simply exude classiness. Someday I hope to be like him.
Wednesday, October 14, 2009
Michael Moore.
From Reason.com:
Michael Moore recently visited George Washington University to do some capitalist-style promotion for his new flick Capitalism: A Love Story and got a little more than he bargained for during the audience Q&A. Check out the clip below where college libertarian Chad Swarthout gets Moore to admit that the real problem is “corporatism” and “giving too much power to government.”
Saturday, October 3, 2009
A Free-Market Guide to Fixing Healthcare
Courtesy of the Mises Institute.
"It's a near-universal assumption of the healthcare debate that the current system is a market system and it is broken, and hence we should try a government system. The people who assume this aren't considering the last 100 years of healthcare policy. Government is deeply involved at all levels, from medical licensure and patents, to direct subsidies and provision, to employee mandates and insurance-pooling controls, at all levels."
"It's been a steady path to medical serfdom all the way, under both parties, and this is precisely what accounts for most of the problems that people complain about. Meanwhile, the private dimensions of the healthcare system are what accounts for its merits."
Wednesday, September 30, 2009
An Evaluation of Thompson's “Plugged-in Violinist” Argument
This is a short paper that I just wrote. It might be somewhat relevant.
Jesse Narveson
09/30/09
Philosophy 315
Professor Ring
CSUF
An Evaluation of Thompson's “Plugged-in Violinist” Argument
In her essay A Defense of Abortion, Judith Thompson gives a compelling, yet logically questionable argument for the moral legitimacy of abortion. She presents a situation in which a woman wakes up in a hospital bed to find a world-class violinist connected to her body for life support. This woman is the violinist's only means of survival, and after nine months he will be healthy enough to live on his own again. Is she morally obliged to give up nine months of her autonomy for the sake of this violinist's life? Thompson argues that no, she is not. But if that's the case, then how can a pregnant mother be morally obliged to sacrifice nine months of her autonomy for the sake of giving life support to a baby?
The key question in any analogy-based argument is whether the two situations are truly similar in a morally relevant way. If not, then the analogy is guilty of a logical slippery slope fallacy. Since there are at least three important differences between Thompson's illustration and an actual abortion, her argument breaks down into a fallacy.
First of all, the violinist in the illustration is artificially attached to the woman, whereas a baby is not “attached” to its mother in an analogous way. It was created (in part) by the mother, and is being nurtured by the natural biological processes within her. Thompson treats a baby as some invading stranger doing harm to its mother, which in reality this isn't the case. A fetus belongs inside its mother; a violinist does not belong in a state of attachment to anyone.
Secondly, Thompson's comparison between having an abortion and withholding life support is unfair. The two events are not even remotely similar. One cannot simply “pull the plug” on baby while it is inside a womb – it has to be violently extracted. To make her analogy stronger, Thompson could have postulated a situation in which the violinist had to be cut into pieces, or crushed to death before the plugs could be removed. Such an analogy would be stronger with respect to logic, but almost certainly weaker in its persuasive effect.
Thirdly, Thompson's analogy fails because it unfairly equates a stranger/stranger relationship to a mother/child relationship. If a stranger does not have any responsibilities to another stranger (as Thompson argues) is it then fair to assume that a mother does not have any responsibilities to her child? Making such an assumption is useful if one wants to justify abortion, but it is dangerous when applied to other situations. For example, a mother could not logically be said to have any responsibilities to her children even after they are born. Children, after all, tend to impinge upon their mother's autonomy for many years. Wouldn't a mother, for the sake of her autonomy, be justified in leaving her children outside to die of exposure? To be logically consistent, Thompson would have to answer in the affirmative.
The central analogy in Thompson's argument is incredibly weak. To assume that the moral justification for ending the life-support of a violinist translates into any moral justification for an abortion is fallacious. Thompson's argument ought to be discarded.
Jesse Narveson
09/30/09
Philosophy 315
Professor Ring
CSUF
An Evaluation of Thompson's “Plugged-in Violinist” Argument
In her essay A Defense of Abortion, Judith Thompson gives a compelling, yet logically questionable argument for the moral legitimacy of abortion. She presents a situation in which a woman wakes up in a hospital bed to find a world-class violinist connected to her body for life support. This woman is the violinist's only means of survival, and after nine months he will be healthy enough to live on his own again. Is she morally obliged to give up nine months of her autonomy for the sake of this violinist's life? Thompson argues that no, she is not. But if that's the case, then how can a pregnant mother be morally obliged to sacrifice nine months of her autonomy for the sake of giving life support to a baby?
The key question in any analogy-based argument is whether the two situations are truly similar in a morally relevant way. If not, then the analogy is guilty of a logical slippery slope fallacy. Since there are at least three important differences between Thompson's illustration and an actual abortion, her argument breaks down into a fallacy.
First of all, the violinist in the illustration is artificially attached to the woman, whereas a baby is not “attached” to its mother in an analogous way. It was created (in part) by the mother, and is being nurtured by the natural biological processes within her. Thompson treats a baby as some invading stranger doing harm to its mother, which in reality this isn't the case. A fetus belongs inside its mother; a violinist does not belong in a state of attachment to anyone.
Secondly, Thompson's comparison between having an abortion and withholding life support is unfair. The two events are not even remotely similar. One cannot simply “pull the plug” on baby while it is inside a womb – it has to be violently extracted. To make her analogy stronger, Thompson could have postulated a situation in which the violinist had to be cut into pieces, or crushed to death before the plugs could be removed. Such an analogy would be stronger with respect to logic, but almost certainly weaker in its persuasive effect.
Thirdly, Thompson's analogy fails because it unfairly equates a stranger/stranger relationship to a mother/child relationship. If a stranger does not have any responsibilities to another stranger (as Thompson argues) is it then fair to assume that a mother does not have any responsibilities to her child? Making such an assumption is useful if one wants to justify abortion, but it is dangerous when applied to other situations. For example, a mother could not logically be said to have any responsibilities to her children even after they are born. Children, after all, tend to impinge upon their mother's autonomy for many years. Wouldn't a mother, for the sake of her autonomy, be justified in leaving her children outside to die of exposure? To be logically consistent, Thompson would have to answer in the affirmative.
The central analogy in Thompson's argument is incredibly weak. To assume that the moral justification for ending the life-support of a violinist translates into any moral justification for an abortion is fallacious. Thompson's argument ought to be discarded.
Saturday, September 26, 2009
Paul Krugman is a Fool.
I have to document this piece on Paul Krugman. Anyone who continues to have a semblance of respect for him should read it.
Monday, September 21, 2009
Descartes: Meditation II
I had to give a presentation on Descartes' second meditation in my epistemology class. I thought I'd throw it up here.
Jesse Narveson
09/21/09
Philosophy 430
Professor Battaly
CSUF
“Archimedes said that if he had one firm and immovable point he could lift the world with a long enough lever; so I too can hope for great things if I manage to find just one little thing that is solid and certain.”
Making this statement right out of the gate, Descartes signals to his readers what he hopes to accomplish in his second meditation. At the end of his previous meditation, Descartes found himself with a world of skepticism blocking his view of any truth. His sensory information was untrustworthy, he could never be sure that he wasn't dreaming, and he couldn't even trust his analytic knowledge. If none these things can be trusted, then what can be? Meditation II is essentially a search for an answer to this question. Descartes hopes not only to find an answer, but that when he does, he can use it as a philosophical fulcrum, to move a world of doubt out of his way. Descartes eventually concludes that this fulcrum is his own existence: it cannot be doubted, and all other knowledge has to be built upon it. After concluding this, Descartes draws out a few implications of his discovery: he defines what the “I” means in the “I exist” statement, he shows that minds are better than bodies, and he shows that knowledge of perceivable things is always gained through the intellect. After explaining Descartes' reasoning, I will explain why it is bad, and why he is still stuck behind a world of skepticism.
The Cogito
Descartes begins his Second Meditation by comparing himself to a man stuck in a whirlpool. He feels as though he doesn't know which way is up or down, what he can believe and what he can't. After a day's worth of doubting everything that he thought he knew, Descartes begins to despair a little, wondering if the only thing that he can be certain of is his uncertainty. Nevertheless, Descartes continues his march through the valley of doubt, hoping to find something that doesn't belong there.
Wondering if he can doubt the existence of God, he asks himself: “Isn’t there a God who gives me the thoughts I am now having?” Descartes replies to himself by saying that no, he could theoretically be the sole cause of his own thoughts. God's existence isn't a necessary condition for his having thoughts. Ah! This sparks something in Descartes. What are the necessary conditions for having thoughts? He then asks himself “doesn’t it follow that I am, at least, something?” His doubtful side remains unconvinced. If he can doubt the existence of every material thing, doesn't it then follow that he can also doubt his own existence? “No it does not follow” his emboldened, hopeful side replies, “for if I convinced myself of something then I certainly existed.” “But there is a supremely powerful and cunning deceiver who deliberately deceives me all the time!” “Even then, if he is deceiving me I undoubtedly exist: let him deceive me all he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing while I think I am something . . . I am, I exist, must be true whenever I assert it or think it.”
This is it: this is what Descartes was hoping to find. He cannot doubt the existence of his own mind. Even if every single one of his beliefs turn out to be false, his mind would still have to exist to house those beliefs. Cogito ergo sum: I think, therefore I exist.
Defining the “I”
After finding what he was looking for, Descartes immediately concerns himself with definitions. If the fact that he exists is going to be a world-moving fulcrum point for him, then he'd better know exactly what it means. The “I” in the “I exist” statement seems particularly ambiguous to him. To find out what it means, he is going to use his familiar method of doubt. Descartes remembers Aristotle's definition of man as a rational animal, but decides to throw this out because there is too much to doubt in it. He then remembers that he used to think of himself as a body and as a soul: as a single being with a duality of substance, consisting of a physical body and a non-physical soul. Descartes then tries to attack both of these notions with some doubt, and discovers immediately that the existence of his body can be doubted. Evil demons are known to make those sorts of deceptions, after all. He then turns to his idea of the soul; can it be doubted as well? Descartes discovers that insofar as his soul is a thinking thing, its existence cannot be doubted. What is a thinking thing? He comes up with a list of characteristics. His thinking mind is something that “doubts almost everything, understands some things, affirms this one thing—namely, that I exist and think, denies everything else, wants to know more, refuses to be deceived, imagines many things involuntarily, and is aware of others that seem to come from the senses.” This seems to satisfy Descartes; he is ready to move on with his argument.
Knowledge Comes Through the Intellect
The subtitle of Meditation II is The nature of the human mind, and how it is better known than the body. Having explored the nature of the human mind, Descartes feels willing to say more about why the mind is superior to the body. In order to critique the knowledge that comes through the body, Descartes is going to critique knowledge of bodies in general. He uses an example of a body that is specific and very familiar to his audience: a piece of wax. He asks his readers to imagine the characteristics of a piece of wax that has just been taken from the honeycomb: it has a very specific look, sound, taste, smell and feel. Now imagine that this same piece of wax is held close to a fire: each of these characteristics change distinctly. Is it still, metaphysically speaking, the same piece of wax? Clearly it is, says Descartes. But if it's still the same piece of wax after all of its characteristics have been changed, what about it is the same? The only thing that remains unchanged in the process is that it is still a “body,” occupying space. Descartes says: “But although my perception of it seemed to be a case of vision and touch and imagination, it isn’t so and it never was. Rather, it is purely a scrutiny by the mind alone—formerly an imperfect and confused one, but now vivid and clear because I am now concentrating carefully on what the wax consists in.” For Descartes, knowledge can't possibly come through the senses, none of its information is consistent. Instead, knowledge has to come the activity of our minds alone. Descartes concludes his second meditation on this happy note, having found some knowledge and the method by which it is obtained.
Critique
At first glance, Descartes seems to present a powerful argument. The reader, having been left throughly depressed by his first meditation, is eager to accept any argument that would allow for the possibility of knowledge. However, the careful reader shouldn't be taken in by Descartes' hopeful rhetoric; it is inconsistent with his method of doubt, and it is logically fallacious.
Right off the bat, I want to take issue with Descartes' choice of subtitle: “The nature of the human mind, and how it is better known than the body.” Perhaps it is a minor point, but it bothers me that Descartes uses the term “human mind” as if to imply that his arguments will apply to some group of people broader than himself. Unfortunately, he never provides any reasons why they should. He hasn't yet even established the fact that other people exist. If Descartes wanted to be consistent with his method of doubt, his subtitle would read something like “The nature of my mind, and how I know it better than the body.”
More fundamentally, Descartes is also not consistent in his application of doubt to his own method of thinking; namely to his logic. Presumably Descartes would say that the laws of logic can be doubted, but if this is the case, then why is Descartes so confidant that anything follows from another thing? Logic alone can dictates necessary inference, and if logic can't be relied upon, then all of Descartes reasoning is untrustworthy. Even worse, his own language would be untrustworthy. If Descartes did not assume the law of contradiction, then nothing would prevent the meaning of his words from also meaning their opposite. Descartes couldn't even think intelligibly without employing logic, because intelligible thoughts have to have meaning, and meaning isn't possible if everything can also mean its opposite. It would seem that if only for sanity's sake, logic shouldn't have been doubted in the first place. But Descartes wanted to doubt everything, and this is where it would lead him if he were consistent.
Moreover, even though Descartes assumes the validity of logic throughout this Meditation, his actual use of it is atrocious. The Cogito, “I think therefore I exist,” is a logical statement, and for that reason alone Descartes ought to doubt it. But even if logic were granted to Descartes, his use of it in this instance is so wretched as to be embarrassing. First of all, he isn't being clear. He only states his conclusion (that he exists) and one of his premises (that he thinks). Obviously, in order for this syllogism to work out, there needs to be a second premises. Descartes would probably agree that this premises has to be “all thinking things exist.” The syllogism would then look like this:
All thinking things exist
I am a thinking thing
Therefore, I exist.
This argument appears valid at first, but it actually commits an informal fallacy: that of begging the question. If the existence of the “I” isn't established until the conclusion, then what is it doing up in the minor premise? Descartes is assuming what he ought to be proving. He assumes that he, the “I” used in the second premise, already exists in order to have the characteristic of thinking. But since the “I” is assumed, there is no reason to proceed with the syllogism; the conclusion gives us nothing more than what was already accepted in the premises. Being a fallacy, The Cogito ought not to be thought of as an indubitable foundation for knowledge.
Descartes himself responded to this criticism of his Meditation by saying that the Cogito wasn't true by virtue of logic, it was instead true by “natural light.” I could respond to this counterargument better if I had an understanding of what “natural light” was, but since Descartes provided no definition, I have no choice but to continue to judge the Cogito by the standard of logic. Arguing that anything is true by virtue of something other than logic seems like a tough sell; and this is probably why Descartes conveniently provided no definition for “natural light.”
I do have to give Descartes credit for one thing in this Meditation, though. His attack on the empirical notion that knowledge is learned through the senses is a fair one. I'm not sure if Descartes stated it better than the ancient Greek, Heraclitus, who said that “no man steps into the same river twice.” Both Heraclitus and Descartes knew that the world is constantly changing, and to try to establish any knowledge based on our limited interaction with this world seems unlikely.
Unfortunately for Descartes, establishing knowledge based on the fact of his existence is also unlikely. His fulcrum failed, and a world of skepticism still remains in between him and the truth. Perhaps instead of looking for a single fact, or a fulcrum, on which to build his knowledge, Descartes ought to have looked for something a little broader. Something less like a fulcrum and more like a cement slab. Knowledge isn't a house that can be built on anything less.
Questions
1.Do you think that Descartes was consistent in his application of doubt to all of his supposed knowledge?
2.Do you think that the Cogito can be true by virtue of something other than logic?
3.What do you think of Descartes attack on the notion that knowledge can be gained through the senses?
Jesse Narveson
09/21/09
Philosophy 430
Professor Battaly
CSUF
Descartes: Meditation II
“Archimedes said that if he had one firm and immovable point he could lift the world with a long enough lever; so I too can hope for great things if I manage to find just one little thing that is solid and certain.”
Making this statement right out of the gate, Descartes signals to his readers what he hopes to accomplish in his second meditation. At the end of his previous meditation, Descartes found himself with a world of skepticism blocking his view of any truth. His sensory information was untrustworthy, he could never be sure that he wasn't dreaming, and he couldn't even trust his analytic knowledge. If none these things can be trusted, then what can be? Meditation II is essentially a search for an answer to this question. Descartes hopes not only to find an answer, but that when he does, he can use it as a philosophical fulcrum, to move a world of doubt out of his way. Descartes eventually concludes that this fulcrum is his own existence: it cannot be doubted, and all other knowledge has to be built upon it. After concluding this, Descartes draws out a few implications of his discovery: he defines what the “I” means in the “I exist” statement, he shows that minds are better than bodies, and he shows that knowledge of perceivable things is always gained through the intellect. After explaining Descartes' reasoning, I will explain why it is bad, and why he is still stuck behind a world of skepticism.
The Cogito
Descartes begins his Second Meditation by comparing himself to a man stuck in a whirlpool. He feels as though he doesn't know which way is up or down, what he can believe and what he can't. After a day's worth of doubting everything that he thought he knew, Descartes begins to despair a little, wondering if the only thing that he can be certain of is his uncertainty. Nevertheless, Descartes continues his march through the valley of doubt, hoping to find something that doesn't belong there.
Wondering if he can doubt the existence of God, he asks himself: “Isn’t there a God who gives me the thoughts I am now having?” Descartes replies to himself by saying that no, he could theoretically be the sole cause of his own thoughts. God's existence isn't a necessary condition for his having thoughts. Ah! This sparks something in Descartes. What are the necessary conditions for having thoughts? He then asks himself “doesn’t it follow that I am, at least, something?” His doubtful side remains unconvinced. If he can doubt the existence of every material thing, doesn't it then follow that he can also doubt his own existence? “No it does not follow” his emboldened, hopeful side replies, “for if I convinced myself of something then I certainly existed.” “But there is a supremely powerful and cunning deceiver who deliberately deceives me all the time!” “Even then, if he is deceiving me I undoubtedly exist: let him deceive me all he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing while I think I am something . . . I am, I exist, must be true whenever I assert it or think it.”
This is it: this is what Descartes was hoping to find. He cannot doubt the existence of his own mind. Even if every single one of his beliefs turn out to be false, his mind would still have to exist to house those beliefs. Cogito ergo sum: I think, therefore I exist.
Defining the “I”
After finding what he was looking for, Descartes immediately concerns himself with definitions. If the fact that he exists is going to be a world-moving fulcrum point for him, then he'd better know exactly what it means. The “I” in the “I exist” statement seems particularly ambiguous to him. To find out what it means, he is going to use his familiar method of doubt. Descartes remembers Aristotle's definition of man as a rational animal, but decides to throw this out because there is too much to doubt in it. He then remembers that he used to think of himself as a body and as a soul: as a single being with a duality of substance, consisting of a physical body and a non-physical soul. Descartes then tries to attack both of these notions with some doubt, and discovers immediately that the existence of his body can be doubted. Evil demons are known to make those sorts of deceptions, after all. He then turns to his idea of the soul; can it be doubted as well? Descartes discovers that insofar as his soul is a thinking thing, its existence cannot be doubted. What is a thinking thing? He comes up with a list of characteristics. His thinking mind is something that “doubts almost everything, understands some things, affirms this one thing—namely, that I exist and think, denies everything else, wants to know more, refuses to be deceived, imagines many things involuntarily, and is aware of others that seem to come from the senses.” This seems to satisfy Descartes; he is ready to move on with his argument.
Knowledge Comes Through the Intellect
The subtitle of Meditation II is The nature of the human mind, and how it is better known than the body. Having explored the nature of the human mind, Descartes feels willing to say more about why the mind is superior to the body. In order to critique the knowledge that comes through the body, Descartes is going to critique knowledge of bodies in general. He uses an example of a body that is specific and very familiar to his audience: a piece of wax. He asks his readers to imagine the characteristics of a piece of wax that has just been taken from the honeycomb: it has a very specific look, sound, taste, smell and feel. Now imagine that this same piece of wax is held close to a fire: each of these characteristics change distinctly. Is it still, metaphysically speaking, the same piece of wax? Clearly it is, says Descartes. But if it's still the same piece of wax after all of its characteristics have been changed, what about it is the same? The only thing that remains unchanged in the process is that it is still a “body,” occupying space. Descartes says: “But although my perception of it seemed to be a case of vision and touch and imagination, it isn’t so and it never was. Rather, it is purely a scrutiny by the mind alone—formerly an imperfect and confused one, but now vivid and clear because I am now concentrating carefully on what the wax consists in.” For Descartes, knowledge can't possibly come through the senses, none of its information is consistent. Instead, knowledge has to come the activity of our minds alone. Descartes concludes his second meditation on this happy note, having found some knowledge and the method by which it is obtained.
Critique
At first glance, Descartes seems to present a powerful argument. The reader, having been left throughly depressed by his first meditation, is eager to accept any argument that would allow for the possibility of knowledge. However, the careful reader shouldn't be taken in by Descartes' hopeful rhetoric; it is inconsistent with his method of doubt, and it is logically fallacious.
Right off the bat, I want to take issue with Descartes' choice of subtitle: “The nature of the human mind, and how it is better known than the body.” Perhaps it is a minor point, but it bothers me that Descartes uses the term “human mind” as if to imply that his arguments will apply to some group of people broader than himself. Unfortunately, he never provides any reasons why they should. He hasn't yet even established the fact that other people exist. If Descartes wanted to be consistent with his method of doubt, his subtitle would read something like “The nature of my mind, and how I know it better than the body.”
More fundamentally, Descartes is also not consistent in his application of doubt to his own method of thinking; namely to his logic. Presumably Descartes would say that the laws of logic can be doubted, but if this is the case, then why is Descartes so confidant that anything follows from another thing? Logic alone can dictates necessary inference, and if logic can't be relied upon, then all of Descartes reasoning is untrustworthy. Even worse, his own language would be untrustworthy. If Descartes did not assume the law of contradiction, then nothing would prevent the meaning of his words from also meaning their opposite. Descartes couldn't even think intelligibly without employing logic, because intelligible thoughts have to have meaning, and meaning isn't possible if everything can also mean its opposite. It would seem that if only for sanity's sake, logic shouldn't have been doubted in the first place. But Descartes wanted to doubt everything, and this is where it would lead him if he were consistent.
Moreover, even though Descartes assumes the validity of logic throughout this Meditation, his actual use of it is atrocious. The Cogito, “I think therefore I exist,” is a logical statement, and for that reason alone Descartes ought to doubt it. But even if logic were granted to Descartes, his use of it in this instance is so wretched as to be embarrassing. First of all, he isn't being clear. He only states his conclusion (that he exists) and one of his premises (that he thinks). Obviously, in order for this syllogism to work out, there needs to be a second premises. Descartes would probably agree that this premises has to be “all thinking things exist.” The syllogism would then look like this:
All thinking things exist
I am a thinking thing
Therefore, I exist.
This argument appears valid at first, but it actually commits an informal fallacy: that of begging the question. If the existence of the “I” isn't established until the conclusion, then what is it doing up in the minor premise? Descartes is assuming what he ought to be proving. He assumes that he, the “I” used in the second premise, already exists in order to have the characteristic of thinking. But since the “I” is assumed, there is no reason to proceed with the syllogism; the conclusion gives us nothing more than what was already accepted in the premises. Being a fallacy, The Cogito ought not to be thought of as an indubitable foundation for knowledge.
Descartes himself responded to this criticism of his Meditation by saying that the Cogito wasn't true by virtue of logic, it was instead true by “natural light.” I could respond to this counterargument better if I had an understanding of what “natural light” was, but since Descartes provided no definition, I have no choice but to continue to judge the Cogito by the standard of logic. Arguing that anything is true by virtue of something other than logic seems like a tough sell; and this is probably why Descartes conveniently provided no definition for “natural light.”
I do have to give Descartes credit for one thing in this Meditation, though. His attack on the empirical notion that knowledge is learned through the senses is a fair one. I'm not sure if Descartes stated it better than the ancient Greek, Heraclitus, who said that “no man steps into the same river twice.” Both Heraclitus and Descartes knew that the world is constantly changing, and to try to establish any knowledge based on our limited interaction with this world seems unlikely.
Unfortunately for Descartes, establishing knowledge based on the fact of his existence is also unlikely. His fulcrum failed, and a world of skepticism still remains in between him and the truth. Perhaps instead of looking for a single fact, or a fulcrum, on which to build his knowledge, Descartes ought to have looked for something a little broader. Something less like a fulcrum and more like a cement slab. Knowledge isn't a house that can be built on anything less.
Questions
1.Do you think that Descartes was consistent in his application of doubt to all of his supposed knowledge?
2.Do you think that the Cogito can be true by virtue of something other than logic?
3.What do you think of Descartes attack on the notion that knowledge can be gained through the senses?
Sunday, September 20, 2009
Friday, September 18, 2009
Trade Wars.
Greg Mankiw with a recap on the recent news:
Obama to impose tariffs on Chinese tires: Obama imposes tariffs on China tires for 3 years, a decision that could anger Asian powerhouse
China Strikes Back on Trade: Beijing Threatens U.S. Chicken, Car Parts After Washington Slaps Stiff Tariffs on Tires
Stocks head lower on US-China trade concerns: Major indexes fall in early dealings amid concerns about US-China trade dispute
Tire Tariffs Are Cheered by Labor: Mr. Obama ordered the tire tariffs after the United States International Trade Commission, an independent government agency, determined that a more than tripling of Chinese tire imports had disrupted the $1.7 billion tire market....President George W. Bush had rejected four similar recommendations from the trade commission, angering organized labor
Wednesday, September 16, 2009
The Race Card.
This is happening sooner than I expected it to.
I admit that throwing the word "racist" at everything to see what sticks has historically been a successful tacit for the Democrats. It won them the black vote. But this time . . . gosh, I just don't see how it can work. There are so few legitimate racists left in America, that it is implausible to me that any substantial number of people would believe that dissent from Obama is fueled by racism. The level of delusion that one has to descend to in order to think that "liar" and "socialist" are racial slurs is breathtaking.
I imagine that demagogues like Jimmy Carter and Maureen Dowd will repeat this mantra ad nauseam to try to sucker in more fools, but I doubt that Americans are stupid enough to buy it. A few more years in our public education system should do the trick, though.
Realclearpolitics has a good piece on the subject.
As does Victor Davis Hanson.
UPDATE: Wow! Krauthammer lambasts Maureen Dowd:
I imagine that demagogues like Jimmy Carter and Maureen Dowd will repeat this mantra ad nauseam to try to sucker in more fools, but I doubt that Americans are stupid enough to buy it. A few more years in our public education system should do the trick, though.
Realclearpolitics has a good piece on the subject.
As does Victor Davis Hanson.
UPDATE: Wow! Krauthammer lambasts Maureen Dowd:
Tuesday, September 15, 2009
Wednesday, September 9, 2009
Testing the Untested Assumption
Assumption: Our educational problems are the result of a lack of money.
Saturday, September 5, 2009
Don't try to "out-Obama Obama."
Politico ran another piece about possible GOP challengers to Obama in 2012. Even though the main focus of the piece was on David Petraeus and Joe Scarborough, this was mentioned:
“Several GOP candidates are coming to the view that the way to run against Obama is not to out-Obama Obama with flash or sizzle,” said Dan Senor, an adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a Bush administration veteran. “They want to go in the opposite direction: smart, back-to-basics, competence.”
Immediately I thought of Tim Pawlenty. He fits that bill perfectly.
I don't know much about Joe Scarborough, but I'd certainly be happy with General David Petraeus as my president. It doesn't seem like Petraeus would make a good of a presidential candidate, though. He's not a politician at all.
I don't know much about Joe Scarborough, but I'd certainly be happy with General David Petraeus as my president. It doesn't seem like Petraeus would make a good of a presidential candidate, though. He's not a politician at all.
Unemployment.
This is . . . really, really bad. (Click to enlarge)
I swear, if our president wasn't the Messiah himself, the media would be all over him on this issue.
Thursday, September 3, 2009
The End of the World.
One day, the world will end;
this fact I do not doubt.
On that day, I hope there is nothing left
in this world that I care about.
When the mountains crumble,
and the earth stands trial,
I hope that I can just sit there
watching with a smile.
I'll breath a sigh of relief
when that day has its debut,
because there will be so much
to look forward to.
this fact I do not doubt.
On that day, I hope there is nothing left
in this world that I care about.
When the mountains crumble,
and the earth stands trial,
I hope that I can just sit there
watching with a smile.
I'll breath a sigh of relief
when that day has its debut,
because there will be so much
to look forward to.
Tuesday, September 1, 2009
Monday, August 31, 2009
Tim, Again.
It's nice to see that Bloomberg agrees with me:
The Democrats ended their presidential hiatus in 1992 and 2008 with a similar formula: Nominate a candidate not associated with Washington’s wars, who doesn’t belong to the party’s ideological base though is acceptable to it, and who can attract independent voters.It is a formula Republicans would do well to replicate next time. If so, there is an aspirant who may fit the bill: Tim Pawlenty. Tim Pawlenty? For the uninformed, he is the two- term Republican governor of Minnesota.
He doesn’t excite Republican passions like Sarah Palin, or bring the intellectual range of Newt Gingrich, the down-home humor of Mike Huckabee or the resources of Mitt Romney. He also brings none of their baggage, has a consistently conservative record, presents his views in a less-confrontational and more measured way, and has succeeded in a Democratic state.
Thursday, August 20, 2009
Wednesday, August 19, 2009
Monday, August 17, 2009
Tim Pawlenty.
In an earlier blog post I predicted that Minnesota governor Tim Pawlenty would be the Republican presidential candidate in 2012.
Pawlenty's biggest challenger will be the former Massachusetts governor, Mitt Romney. Romney cannot win for several reasons, the first of which being that he will not appeal to all of the republican constituencies. The second reason is that the universal health care plan that he initiated in Massachusetts has largely failed. To be fair, the Democratic congress in Massachusetts is more culpable for its failure, but I doubt that it will be seen this way by the electorate since he signed the bill. Romney is unfortunately on the wrong end of today's most popular political topic.
On the other hand, Romeny is very well known. This is because of his 2008 presidential bid and because of his support from talk radio.
Tim Pawlenty isn't without his problems, either. His biggest problem right now is that no one knows who he is. To compound the matter, I don't see him as a particularly exciting or inspiring candidate. He shies away from soaring rhetoric and tends to hone in on the details of policy debates. In this respect, he is virtually the polar opposite of Barack Obama: Tim Pawlenty has solid credentials, he is precise on his issues, he has a good track record (particurarly in the fiscal realm), and he isn't inspiring. It's difficult to tell whether such a stark distinction will play to his advantage in 2012.
I'd like to see Tim Pawlenty take more leadership in the Republican party in the next couple of years. I hope that the RNC gives him the opportunity to. This is a good start.
Pawlenty's biggest challenger will be the former Massachusetts governor, Mitt Romney. Romney cannot win for several reasons, the first of which being that he will not appeal to all of the republican constituencies. The second reason is that the universal health care plan that he initiated in Massachusetts has largely failed. To be fair, the Democratic congress in Massachusetts is more culpable for its failure, but I doubt that it will be seen this way by the electorate since he signed the bill. Romney is unfortunately on the wrong end of today's most popular political topic.
On the other hand, Romeny is very well known. This is because of his 2008 presidential bid and because of his support from talk radio.
Tim Pawlenty isn't without his problems, either. His biggest problem right now is that no one knows who he is. To compound the matter, I don't see him as a particularly exciting or inspiring candidate. He shies away from soaring rhetoric and tends to hone in on the details of policy debates. In this respect, he is virtually the polar opposite of Barack Obama: Tim Pawlenty has solid credentials, he is precise on his issues, he has a good track record (particurarly in the fiscal realm), and he isn't inspiring. It's difficult to tell whether such a stark distinction will play to his advantage in 2012.
I'd like to see Tim Pawlenty take more leadership in the Republican party in the next couple of years. I hope that the RNC gives him the opportunity to. This is a good start.
Thursday, August 13, 2009
Tuesday, August 11, 2009
Sunday, August 9, 2009
Socialism?
I don't quite understand these posters. They don't make sense. For one thing, the Joker is an Anarchist and not a socialist.
They remind me of the the Bush-Hitler posters: it's an unfavorable comparison, but ultimately nonsensical.
And, just as a side note, no one has the right to get upset over these types of comparisons given the last eight years of them.
Saturday, August 8, 2009
Friday, August 7, 2009
Sunday, August 2, 2009
Surprise.
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and National Economic Council Director Larry Summer both admit that they're probably going to have to raise taxes on the "middle class." Obama promised us that this wouldn't happen.
Will Obama veto any bills that contain a middle class tax hike? Keep in mind, he's not particularly known for keeping his promises.
Will Obama veto any bills that contain a middle class tax hike? Keep in mind, he's not particularly known for keeping his promises.
Saturday, August 1, 2009
Friday, July 31, 2009
Tax the Rich.
Wall Street Journal: Newly released data from the IRS clearly debunks the conventional Beltway rhetoric that the "rich" are not paying their fair share of taxes.
Indeed, the IRS data shows that in 2007—the most recent data available—the top 1 percent of taxpayers paid 40.4 percent of the total income taxes collected by the federal government. This is the highest percentage in modern history. By contrast, the top 1 percent paid 24.8 percent of the income tax burden in 1987, the year following the 1986 tax reform act."
Racism!
American Thinker: "Sergeant Crowley, the sole class act in this trio, helps the handicapped Professor Gates down the stairs, while Barack Obama, heedless of the infirmities of his friend and fellow victim of self-defined racial profiling, strides ahead on his own. So who is compassionate? And who is so self-involved and arrogant that he is oblivious?"
Tim Geithner, Jon Stewart.
| The Daily Show With Jon Stewart | Mon - Thurs 11p / 10c | |||
| ||||
Cash for Clunkers.
This is the government that we are asking to run our health care industry — the same government that can't even make the most basic of economic forecasts. Why should we expect their intervention to have better results when it is done to the health care industry?
The problem with the "Cash for Clunkers" program is a systemic one. It's the same problem that the Military has, that the post office has, that Medicaid has, that Federal Schools have, that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have, and that Amtrak has. It is this: none of these institutions are able to economize their decisions. They can't use their resources efficiently. Even if they wanted to (which they often don't) they couldn't; they don't have the information to. That information is contained only in the pricing system — a system that the government definitionally operates outside of.
Those who want the government to make more health care decisions ought to have the intellectual honesty to admit that those decisions will become less economical. Being "less economical" is not something to accept lightly, however, particularly in regard to health care. "Less economical" translates "more expensive," which in turn translates "less care" or "lower quality of care." Or both.
Why anyone would want a health care system with these results is beyond me.
The problem with the "Cash for Clunkers" program is a systemic one. It's the same problem that the Military has, that the post office has, that Medicaid has, that Federal Schools have, that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have, and that Amtrak has. It is this: none of these institutions are able to economize their decisions. They can't use their resources efficiently. Even if they wanted to (which they often don't) they couldn't; they don't have the information to. That information is contained only in the pricing system — a system that the government definitionally operates outside of.
Those who want the government to make more health care decisions ought to have the intellectual honesty to admit that those decisions will become less economical. Being "less economical" is not something to accept lightly, however, particularly in regard to health care. "Less economical" translates "more expensive," which in turn translates "less care" or "lower quality of care." Or both.
Why anyone would want a health care system with these results is beyond me.
Thursday, July 30, 2009
First Fig.
My candle burns at both ends;-Edna St. Vincent Millay
It will not last the night;
But ah my foes, and oh, my friends—
It gives a lovely light.
Wednesday, July 29, 2009
The Role of the Constitution.
Let me hear no more of the goodness of man; let us tie the tyrants down with the chains of the Constitution.-Thomas Jefferson.
Monday, July 27, 2009
Sunday, July 26, 2009
Monday, July 20, 2009
Interesting News Items.
Wednesday, July 15, 2009
Friday, July 10, 2009
Happy Birthday.
Today is 500th birthday of John Calvin — one of the world's most under-appreciated thinkers.
Thursday, July 9, 2009
Tuesday, July 7, 2009
Michael Jackson.
The way that Michael Jackson's funeral service was conducted demonstrates an insane cultural aversion to the pricing mechanism.
For some strange reason, the people in charge of the service insisted that the majority of the tickets be given out for "free." I put "free" in quotes, because of course, those tickets weren't actually free. The city of Los Angeles had to pick up the tab, which came out to about four million dollars. Why should taxpayers who live in Los Angeles be forced to pay for their neighbors to see Michael Jackson's funeral service? This doesn't seem to make sense, especially when the majority of the ticket holders would have been willing and able to pay for the tickets themselves.
By pushing the ticket prices down to zero, those in charge of the funeral ensured that the demand for tickets would exceed the available supply. This, in economic terms, is called a shortage. It is a market condition where willing buyers cannot find a willing seller. If prices were allowed to rise to the point where supply and demand intersected, the market would "clear," and every willing buyer could find a willing seller. There would be no need to randomly select patrons to give free tickets to — everyone would decide for themselves whether or not they wanted to attend at the given cost.
The only reason that I can come up with for why this wasn't done, is that people would probably be disgusted by it. You would hear people say things like: "they're forcing us to pay to see a funeral service? What is this country coming to!"
Why do we have a cultural aversion to this process? Why do we assume that it is nobler to give out "free" tickets; when doing so ensures an inequitable distribution of those tickets, as well as a forcible collection of payment?
For some strange reason, the people in charge of the service insisted that the majority of the tickets be given out for "free." I put "free" in quotes, because of course, those tickets weren't actually free. The city of Los Angeles had to pick up the tab, which came out to about four million dollars. Why should taxpayers who live in Los Angeles be forced to pay for their neighbors to see Michael Jackson's funeral service? This doesn't seem to make sense, especially when the majority of the ticket holders would have been willing and able to pay for the tickets themselves.
By pushing the ticket prices down to zero, those in charge of the funeral ensured that the demand for tickets would exceed the available supply. This, in economic terms, is called a shortage. It is a market condition where willing buyers cannot find a willing seller. If prices were allowed to rise to the point where supply and demand intersected, the market would "clear," and every willing buyer could find a willing seller. There would be no need to randomly select patrons to give free tickets to — everyone would decide for themselves whether or not they wanted to attend at the given cost.
The only reason that I can come up with for why this wasn't done, is that people would probably be disgusted by it. You would hear people say things like: "they're forcing us to pay to see a funeral service? What is this country coming to!"
Why do we have a cultural aversion to this process? Why do we assume that it is nobler to give out "free" tickets; when doing so ensures an inequitable distribution of those tickets, as well as a forcible collection of payment?
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